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Towards a Dialogue between  
Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘Critical Sociology’ and  
Luc Boltanski’s ‘Pragmatic Sociology of Critique’1 
Simon Susen 
(Translated by Simon Susen) 
 
Introduction 
One of the most fruitful sources of controversy in the contemporary 
sociological literature, notably in France, is the debate on the relationship 
between two prominent paradigmatic programmes, which are often regarded 
as diametrically opposed: on the one hand, Pierre Bourdieu’s critical sociology, 
which has been increasingly influential since the 1970s; on the other hand, 
Luc Boltanski’s pragmatic sociology of critique, which has become widely known 
since the late 1980s. Not only in recent Francophone2 intellectual discussions, 
but also in current Germanophone3 and Anglophone4 sociological disputes, 
the writings of both Bourdieu and Boltanski are commonly considered as 
major contributions to the social sciences. 
Although their works have attained a remarkable degree of  recognition  
in contemporary academic fields, and despite the fact that the intellectual 
connections between ‘critical sociology’ and the ‘pragmatic sociology of 
critique’ have been explored by various commentators,5 the key points of 
convergence and divergence between Bourdieu and Boltanski have hardly 
been examined in a systematic fashion.6 To the extent that most studies 
concerned with the important insights provided by these two thinkers 
emphasize the profound differences between their sociological frameworks,  
it  appears  difficult  – or, perhaps, even inconceivable – to suggest that it is 
possible to reconcile, let alone integrate, Bourdieusian and Boltanskian 
modes of investigation. The main purpose of this chapter is to make a case for 
the ‘reconciliation’7 between Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ and Boltanski’s 
‘pragmatic sociology of critique’. 
  
 
With the aim of demonstrating that it is not only viable but also desirable to 
‘make them compatible’8 and thereby pursue ‘an objective of pacification’,9 
the analysis will scrutinize the principal points of convergence and divergence 
between Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ and Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology 
of critique’. By way of conclusion, the chapter formulates eight hypotheses 
regarding the possibility of cross-fertilizing these two approaches. 
 
I. Points of Convergence between 
Bourdieu and Boltanski 
There are several points of convergence between Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ 
and Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’. In order to create a space of 
dialogue between these two approaches, this section shall focus on their most 
significant commonalities. 
 
1. The Concept of ‘the Social’ 
A first point of convergence between ‘critical sociology’ and the ‘pragmatic 
sociology of critique’ stems  from  their  ambition  to comprehend  the nature 
of ‘the social’. To be precise, both projects constitute, first and foremost, 
sociological – rather than philosophical, anthropological, historical, economic, or 
psychological – approaches. As such, they examine the constitution and evolution 
of reality in terms of the social relations established between human entities. 
Regardless of the specificity of the key conceptual tools by means of which they 
explore the relational configuration of the universe, both accounts aim to study 
human existence by shedding light on its social nature – that is, by insisting on 
the sociological significance of its collectively constructed constitution.10 
 
2. The Concept of ‘Practice’ 
A second point of convergence between ‘critical sociology’ and the 
‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ can be found in their common interest in 
the nature of ‘practice’. In light of this shared area of intellectual concern, 
both sociological frameworks can be described as pragmatic or praxeological, 
rather than as scholastic or transcendental, approaches. Stressing the 
practical constitution of human reality, the two research traditions consider 
the social universe as an ensemble of concrete actions accomplished by 
performative and embodied entities. On this view, social environments cannot 
be properly understood without taking into account the specific modes of 
functioning underlying particular forms of action. In both Bourdieu’s and 
Boltanski’s writings,  the methodological privilege attributed to human practices 
  
 
manifests itself not only in the numerous empirical studies11 underpinning 
their conceptual architecture of the social, but also in the terminology 
employed by these two authors. Bourdieu proposes a ‘theory of practice’,12 
which is inspired by a critical reflection upon the sociological significance  
of ‘practical reasons’13 and which seeks to uncover the structuring capacity  
of the ‘sens pratique’.14 In a similar vein, Boltanski puts forward the idea of 
a ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’,15 which does justice to the sociological 
centrality of ‘practical justifications’16 and which aims to shed light on the 
normativizing capacity of ‘practical criticism’.17 In short, highlighting the 
foundational importance of social actions in the daily construction of reality, 
both frameworks illustrate that the very possibility of society depends upon 
the unfolding of human practices.18 
 
3. The Concept of ‘Critique’ 
A third point of convergence between ‘critical sociology’ and the ‘pragmatic 
sociology of critique’ can be found in the pivotal role that the systematic 
exploration of the nature of ‘critique’ plays in their analysis. As reflected in 
the respective names of these two programmes, both sociological projects 
can be described as profoundly normative, rather than simply descriptive, 
ventures. In the case of Bourdieu, the label ‘critical sociology’19 suggests that 
we are dealing with an explicitly ‘critical’ and ‘normative’, rather than with 
an ‘uncritical’ and merely ‘descriptive’, endeavour. In the case of Boltanski, 
the formulation ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’20 places the emphasis on 
the sociological importance of the concept of critique, which is converted 
into its most fundamental object of study. For  Boltanski, in order to grasp  
the socio-ontological, rather than metaphysical, status of critique, we need  
to scrutinize the ways in which critique is ‘mobilized’ and ‘used’ by ordinary 
people, rather than ‘theorized’ and ‘systematized’ by scholars and experts. 
Despite substantial epistemological differences between the two thinkers, 
Bourdieu and Boltanski converge in that they not only conceive of sociology 
as a normative undertaking but also attach paradigmatic significance to the 
concept of critique within this discipline.21 
 
4. The Concept of ‘Interest’ 
A fourth point of convergence between ‘critical sociology’ and the 
‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ concerns the fact that both projects aim to 
comprehend the functioning of different modes of  human coexistence  in 
terms of ‘social interests’. Owing to the praxeological importance that they 
ascribe to social interests,  especially  to  the  multiple  forms  in which they 
  
 
structure people’s everyday activities, the two sociological frameworks can 
be characterized as functionalist, or at least as quasi-functionalist, rather than 
as intentionalist. To  put it bluntly, Bourdieu and Boltanski are motivated  by 
a sociological interest in the nature of social interests. Assuming that human 
actions are never ‘disinterested’ or ‘neutral’ but always ‘interested’ and 
‘biased’, both approaches can be conceived of as functionalist, or quasi- 
functionalist, accounts of society. It is important to stress, however, that the 
realist view that all human practices are permeated and influenced by social 
interests is not tantamount to the fatalistic notion that  all  human actions are 
motivated and determined by these interests. According to the former 
perspective, social interests are largely implicit and  manifest themselves  in 
people’s intentions, choices, and actions, without them necessarily being 
aware of the influence that the motivational background of  their lives 
exercises on their behaviour. According to the latter interpretation, social 
interests – whether they are implicit or explicit – constitute the principal 
motivational driving force governing people’s goals, preferences, and 
practices, irrespective of whether or not those who are actuated by them are 
conscious of, and able to reflect upon, their determining power. Bourdieu 
and Boltanski agree on the decisive role that social interests play in the daily 
construction of collective life. Thus, they both recognize that every 
individual or collective performance is, directly or indirectly, shaped by a 
series of explicit or implicit interests.22 
 
5. The Concept of ‘Aporia’ 
A fifth point of convergence between ‘critical sociology’ and the ‘pragmatic 
sociology of critique’ is expressed in their attempt to overcome what may  
be conceived of as ‘aporia’ or ‘insoluble contradictions’ in rival intellectual 
traditions. In this sense, the two frameworks can be regarded as reflexive, and 
thus non-dogmatic, approaches. It is worth mentioning that their radical and 
overt opposition to other sociological and philosophical systems of analysis 
is so pronounced that they have led to the creation of new paradigms for 
studying the functioning of society. Bourdieu contests the epistemic validity of 
‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ theories, whilst Boltanski is particularly critical 
of ‘scientistic’ and ‘determinist’ modes of thought. Given this sceptical stance, 
both Bourdieusian and Boltanskian models can be considered as normative 
projects aimed at transcending the ‘aporia’ and ‘insoluble contradictions’ inherent 
in reductive approaches in the social sciences. In other words, Bourdieu and 
Boltanski are united by  their relentless critique of  intellectual paradigms   
by which they have been influenced themselves, but whose weaknesses and 
limitations they seek to overcome.23 
  
 
6. The Concept of ‘Background’ 
A sixth point of convergence between ‘critical sociology’ and the ‘pragmatic 
sociology of critique’ emanates from the presupposition that all human 
interactions are embedded in a ‘structural background’ or, if one prefers, situated 
in a ‘social grammar’. Consequently, these two accounts may be characterized 
as contextualist, rather than as transcendentalist, approaches. Highlighting the 
sociological importance of the fact that there is no human interaction – that 
is, in effect, no human action – which escapes the power of the historical 
background permeating the spatio-temporal context in which it has emerged, 
both frameworks tend to examine the functioning of the social world in terms 
of its grammatical structuration. The increasing complexification of differentiated 
societies is illustrated in the pluralization of interactional grammars. In this 
regard, it is possible to focus on different levels of analysis: the individual or 
the collective, community or society, ephemeral or durable circumstances, 
spontaneous or ritualized interactions, formal or informal situations, official 
or unofficial spaces, codified or improvised behaviours – to mention only the 
most obvious domains of contextualist investigation in sociology. Irrespective 
of the specificity of a chosen exploratory focus, it is important to acknowledge 
that all human actions are embedded in particular grammars that impose – 
largely in implicit and subtle, but sometimes also in explicit and overt, ways – 
their logic upon the unfolding of social life. Regardless of whether we 
consider a ‘field’ (champ) – in the Bourdieusian sense – or a ‘city’ (cité) – in the 
Boltanskian sense – as the foundational background setting of a given social 
action, or of a given set of social actions, we need to account for the fact that, 
in the human universe, there is no ‘doing’ without ‘framing’ – to borrow an 
insight from Goffman.24 Bourdieu and Boltanski converge in that both insist 
upon the structuring influence of social contexts, which impose themselves 
as – implicit or explicit – points of reference upon different forms of human 
agency.25 
 
7. The Concept of ‘Power’ 
A seventh point of convergence between ‘critical sociology’ and the 
‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ can be discovered in their analysis of ‘social 
power’ and, more specifically, of ‘social domination’. In light of this normative 
mission, the two accounts can be conceived of as critical, rather than naïve, 
approaches. To be exact, they are committed to the thoroughgoing study of 
the multiple ways in which social relations are pervaded and sustained by  
power relations. To this end, they offer conceptual tools and methodological 
strategies  capable of unmasking the constitution of power,   notably in terms 
  
 
of its ubiquity within different modes of coexistence. Of course, recognizing 
the omnipresence of power is not tantamount to believing in its omnipotence.26 
Put differently, the fact that power relations are omnipresent does not mean 
that they are omnipotent. We are all immersed in power relations without 
necessarily being determined by them. All social actions are permeated and 
influenced by power; this does not imply, however, that the former are inevitably 
motivated and determined by the latter. Notwithstanding the paradigmatic and 
ideological differences between Bourdieusian and Boltanskian thought, the 
two approaches share a fundamental interest in the multifaceted ways in 
which power asserts itself as a ubiquitous force in the daily construction of 
social relations.27 
 
8. The Concept of ‘Emancipation’ 
An eighth, and final, point of convergence between ‘critical sociology’ and 
the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ is the following: in both frameworks, the 
critique of power in general and of domination in particular is motivated by 
the conviction that sociology – insofar as it is aimed at problematizing the 
detrimental and pathological effects of the reproduction of vertical relations – 
needs to take on the challenge of analysing the material and symbolic 
conditions of ‘human emancipation’. Hence, both projects can be conceived of 
as two normatively committed, rather than neutral, endeavours. Surely, the idea 
of propagating utopian blueprints is as alien to Bourdieu as it is to Boltanski. 
Even if the left-leaning orientation underlying their approaches is beyond 
doubt, particularly in terms of their engagement with intellectual currents 
associated with the Marxist tradition, it would be erroneous to associate either 
Bourdieusian or Boltanskian thought with a monolithic ideological programme, 
let alone to accuse them of falling into the trap of historical reductionism or 
political proselytism. 
Despite their scepticism vis-à-vis grand ideological projects and dogmatic 
slogans, both Bourdieu and Boltanski conceive of sociology as a ‘critical’ and 
‘committed’ undertaking. Moreover, they share the view that the denunciation 
of domination must be accompanied by the willingness to envisage the 
creation of the social conditions that make emancipatory processes possible 
in the first place. In other words, the negation of repressive mechanisms has 
little value without the affirmation of emancipatory forces. At first glance, the 
theoretical task of reflecting upon the possibility of emancipation may appear 
relatively straightforward; the practical task of  converting  emancipation 
into a reality, however, could hardly be more challenging. Sociologists have 
categorized and interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change 
and improve it.28 
  
 
II. Points of Divergence between 
Bourdieu and Boltanski 
Having identified the main points of convergence between Bourdieu and 
Boltanski, it is no less important to reflect upon the several dimensions that 
separate these two sociologists from one another. Following the structure of 
the previous analysis, this section aims to demonstrate that, paradoxically, the 
key points of convergence between Bourdieu and Boltanski are, at the same 
time, the most significant points of divergence between these two thinkers. As 
shall be demonstrated here, in order to create a constructive dialogue between 
the sociological paradigms developed by these two scholars, it is essential to 
take into account both the commonalities and the differences between them. 
The project of cross-fertilizing their frameworks will fail if one is not prepared 
to accept that the two approaches are separated by profound – and, in some 
respects, irreconcilable – theoretical and methodological presuppositions. 
 
 
1. The Concept of ‘the Social’ 
A first point of divergence can be located in their respective conceptions of 
‘the social’. Whilst both approaches are sociological in terms of their disciplinary 
outlook, they are based on fundamentally different conceptions of the social. 
This can be illustrated by reference to various analytical levels. 
First, they endorse different conceptions of social action. In Bourdieusian 
thought, the foundational mode of social action is ‘homological action’. According 
to this perspective, human action tends to unfold on the basis of the dialectic 
between field and habitus – that is, through the interplay between objective 
positions, situated within social spaces, and subjective dispositions, inscribed 
in social bodies. By contrast, in Boltanskian thought, the foundational mode 
of social action is ‘pragmatic action’. According to this view, human action tends 
to be realized on the basis of the dialectic between cité and justification – that is, 
through the interplay between orders of worth (grandeurs), established within 
social regimes, and discursive practices of testing (épreuves), undertaken by 
social actors. 
Second, they put forward different conceptions of social relations. Following 
the Bourdieusian approach, all social relations are power relations: every field is a 
‘space of possibles’ (espace des possibles) within which agents are exposed to underlying 
structural constraints. These constraints exist independently of people’s wills, 
they impose themselves as omnipresent forces upon any form of human agency, 
and they manifest themselves in the vertical structuration of social orders. 
Following the Boltanskian approach, all social relations are normative relations: 
every cité is a ‘space of tests’ (espace des épreuves),  within  which  actors are able to 
  
 
create implicit or explicit regulative  principles.  These principles  are  applied 
in accordance with people’s wills, they are constantly evaluated as rules of 
performance, and they are negotiated through processes of justification oriented 
towards the construction of different regimes of action. 
Third, they advocate different conceptions of social competence. For Bourdieu, 
social agents possess a ‘homological competence’, which permits them to acquire 
bodily dispositions corresponding to the positions that they occupy within 
different relational spaces. On this account, ordinary people are, by and large, 
unconscious agents, whose heteronomy is due to the orchestrated functioning 
of  their subjectivity and their imprisonment within a naturalized habitus.  
For Boltanski, on the other hand, social actors are equipped with a ‘critical 
competence’, which gives them the capacity to develop and mobilize normative 
resources when engaging in disputes, which arise in different contexts. On 
this view, ordinary people need to be taken seriously as conscious actors, whose 
autonomy stems from their capacity to call their immersion within different 
regimes of action into question – a capacity that is expressed in the critical 
force of reflection and the discursive power of justification. 
Fourth, they subscribe to different conceptions of social development. 
According to Bourdieu, the history of all hitherto existing society is the 
history of struggles between dominant and dominated groups. The evolution 
of society, understood as the ensemble of interconnected fields, is determined 
by structural conflicts between social groups, which are driven by specific 
interests and compete for material and symbolic resources in multiple 
historical fields. According to Boltanski, the history of all hitherto existing 
society is the history of disputes between critical actors capable of undertaking 
discursive tests (épreuves).29 The evolution of society, understood as the 
ensemble of interwoven cités, is shaped by controversies between collective 
actors, who need to provide justifications in order to form different regimes 
of action and who are obliged to assess the legitimacy of the principles that 
govern the organization of their cités. 
Fifth, they embrace different conceptions of social order. For Bourdieu, the 
construction of society is founded on the interdependence between field and 
habitus. For Boltanski, it is the interrelation between cité and competence which is 
vital to the possibility of human coexistence. From a Bourdieusian angle, the 
cornerstone of relational objectivity is the field, and the corpus maintaining our 
subjectivity is the habitus. From a Boltanskian point of view, the interactional 
basis of social objectivity is the cité, and what sustains our subjectivity is a set 
of normative capacities. In Bourdieu, the reproductive nature of the social is 
inextricably linked to the positional constitution of fields and to the dispositional 
composition of the habitus. In Boltanski, the transformative nature of the 
social  is inherent  in the normative construction of cités and the reflexive orientation 
  
 
of our critical competence. For Bourdieu, within every system of domination, 
the field is the predominant relational space, and our homological competence 
is essential to mechanisms of social reproduction. For Boltanski, within every 
regime of action, the cité is the preponderant discursive space, and our critical 
competence is crucial to processes of social transformation. 
 
2. The Concept of ‘Practice’ 
A second point of divergence concerns their respective conceptions of 
‘practice’. Even though both Bourdieu and Boltanski emphasize the processual 
constitution of reality, they have dissimilar understandings of ‘practice’. This 
conceptual discrepancy can be illustrated on three levels. 
First, they defend different conceptions of practical action. In Bourdieu, 
practical action is, above all, a ‘homological act’: as human agents whose practices 
are situated in fields and realized through different forms of habitus, all our 
actions remain embedded within a structural homology between a relational 
objectivity, which is structured in accordance with fought-over positions, and 
an embodied subjectivity, which is organized in accordance with multiple 
naturalized dispositions. In Boltanski, practical action is a source of ‘pragmatic 
engagement’: as human actors whose practices either converge with or diverge 
from the particular orders of worth with which we find ourselves confronted, 
all our actions need to affirm their legitimacy in the face of the fragility 
inherent in reality, whose normativity is constantly at stake in the disputes 
taking place in different cités. 
Second, they support different conceptions of practical competence. According 
to Bourdieu, people’s key practical competence is their sens pratique – that is, 
their intuitive capacity to perform in everyday life by coping with numerous 
codified imperatives with which they are confronted within different social 
fields. Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’ seeks to account for the sociological 
power of ‘practical reasons’, rather than for the scholastic power of ‘theoretical 
reasons’. For it is on the basis of their ‘practical and intuitive abilities’, rather 
than by virtue of their ‘theoretical and reflexive capacities’, that agents succeed 
in mastering the codes that enable them to participate in the game of reality. 
According to Boltanski, people’s most empowering practical competence is 
their sens normatif – that is, their reflexive capacity to justify their actions in 
everyday life by attributing value to the orders of worth that predominate 
within particular cités and whose legitimacy they need to prove and justify. 
Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ aims to account for the sociological 
power of ‘practical justifications’, rather than for the philosophical power of 
‘theoretical justifications’. It is because of their ‘critical and moral capacities’, 
rather than due to their ‘doxic and misleading preconceptions’, that actors 
  
 
are able to distance themselves from their immersion in reality and thereby 
assess the value of their performances in terms of the multiple orders of worth 
generated by different cités. 
Third, they maintain different conceptions of practical agency. Following 
Bourdieu, people can be conceived of as ‘agents’ – that is, as social entities whose 
practices are always relatively determined by the positions they occupy in different 
fields and by the dispositions they obtain through their habitus. To the extent that 
every field constitutes a ‘relational space of possibles’ and every habitus represents a 
‘corporeal apparatus of possibles’, the possibilities with which agents are confronted 
are structured and limited by the positions they occupy within relational spaces 
and by the dispositions they carry within their embodied subjectivities. Put 
differently, the endogenous potential of people’s practices  is determined by 
the exogenous contingence of their existence. Following Boltanski, by contrast, 
people should be regarded as ‘actors’ – that is, as social entities whose practices 
acquire meaning in relation to the orders of worth constructed in the cités within 
which they are situated. Confronted with the challenges arising from plural 
socialization and communicational justification processes, actors are obliged to 
mobilize their reflexive resources, which enable them to negotiate normative 
codes. To the extent that cités form ‘grammars of worth’ and critical competences 
require ‘judgements of worth’, people need to be taken seriously as discursive actors, 
who are able to negotiate normative principles established for the construction 
of collective realities. In other words, the normative constitution of reality 
emanates from the reflexive capacities of our subjectivity. 
 
3. The Concept of ‘Critique’ 
A third point of divergence relates to their respective conceptions of ‘critique’. 
Bourdieu and Boltanski concur in considering sociology as a normative tool 
that permits us to question the multifaceted ways in which social relations are 
permeated by power relations. Yet, their respective conceptions of critique 
differ from one another in several respects. 
First, they endorse different conceptions of the status of critique. In 
Bourdieusian thought, critique tends to be conceived of as a professional privilege 
of researchers in the social sciences. The famous ‘double epistemological 
break’,30 advocated by  Bourdieu, concerns two forms of  demarcation: (a) 
the break of sociological knowledge with scholastic knowledge is aimed at bypassing 
the pitfalls of theoretical reason, which fails to take into account the social 
conditions of production underlying epistemic acts; (b) the break of sociological 
knowledge with ordinary knowledge is aimed at overcoming the limitations of 
common sense, which remains trapped in the doxic categories constructed 
on the basis of everyday experiences. On this view, critical reason, which can 
  
 
be used to deconstruct the misconceptions underlying both scholastic and 
ordinary knowledge, constitutes a professional privilege of experts, rather than 
a universal resource to which, in principle, everyone has access. By contrast, 
in Boltanskian thought, critique is explicitly interpreted as a universal resource 
of ordinary people. The pragmatic imperative according to which ‘ordinary 
actors need to be taken seriously’31 aims to do justice to the fact that critique, 
far from being reducible to an exclusive privilege of metaphysicians and 
experts, represents a structuring and transformative element of ordinary life. 
Critique is ‘always already’ present in everyday existence, to the extent that 
reflexive capacities constitute pragmatic competences of ordinary people.  
To assume that ‘we are all metaphysicians’32 means to suggest that we are 
equipped with reflexive capacities, enabling us to assess the state of affairs by 
which we are surrounded and the legitimacy of the practices through which 
we construct the world to which we belong. According to Boltanski, then, 
critical reason – which permits people to question the forms of normativity 
established in their society – is a universal resource to which, at least potentially, 
everybody has access, rather than a professional privilege of experts. 
Second, they advocate different conceptions of the function of critique. On 
various occasions, Bourdieu insists on the scientificity of the social sciences in 
general and of sociology in particular, assigning critique the role of unmasking 
the underlying mechanisms that constitute reality. From this perspective, the key 
task of sociological critique is to uncover the structural mechanisms that are hidden 
behind the illusory and deceptive façade of everyday appearances. In this sense, 
the Bourdieusian conception of critique is firmly embedded in the Durkheimian 
paradigm of ‘explanation’ (explication/Erklären): critique permits the social scientist 
to shed light on the hidden determinants of society and to deconstruct false 
representations of reality. In this respect, Boltanski and Bourdieu seem to be 
diametrically opposed to one another. Emphasizing the normativity of social worlds 
in general and of different cités in particular, Boltanski implies that one essential 
function of critique is its capacity to assess validity claims necessary to justify the 
legitimacy of ‘tests of worth’ (épreuves de grandeur). On this account, the main task 
of social critique is to assess codes of legitimacy established within a given cité. The 
members of a cité are perfectly able to participate in processes of comprehension, 
reflection, and discussion; in fact, they seek to attribute legitimacy to their multiple 
forms of action on the basis of intersubjective practices of justification. In this 
sense, the Boltanskian conception of critique is intimately interrelated with the 
Weberian paradigm of ‘understanding’ (compréhension/Verstehen): critique enables 
rational actors to question established conventions and to assert themselves as 
creators of their own normativity. 
Third, they embrace different conceptions of the purpose of critique. For 
Bourdieu, critique is oriented towards the deconstruction of doxa: in order to benefit 
  
 
from the insights gained from critical capacity, it is necessary to overcome the 
illusions of common sense.  To  the extent that ordinary agents are doomed to  
be deluded by preconceptions and, consequently, contribute to the reproduction 
of social relations based on domination, sociological critique needs to draw 
upon epistemological tools and methodological strategies of science, in order to 
play a fruitful role in the construction of a social order shaped by emancipatory 
practices. In other words, the first step towards challenging mechanisms of 
domination through processes of  emancipation is to shift from doxic illusion   
to critical insight, from intuitive belief to reflexive reasoning, from practical 
immersion to theoretical distance-taking, and from know-how to know-why. For 
Boltanski, by contrast, critique is oriented towards the undertaking of ‘tests’ (épreuves): 
in order to legitimize the ensemble of  relations established between actors, it    
is necessary to carry out ‘tests of worth’ (épreuves de grandeur). To the extent that 
human actors are able to call the validity of preconceptions into question and,  
in so doing, contribute to the consolidation of social relations based on coherent 
processes of justification, ordinary criticism can, and  indeed  should,  draw 
upon the discursive force and normative value of disputes, in order to generate 
empowering realms that convert people into protagonists capable of reflecting 
upon their own socialization. 
 
4. The Concept of ‘Interest’ 
A fourth point of divergence derives from their respective conceptions of 
‘social interests’. Undoubtedly, both approaches remind us of the sociological 
significance of social interests, notably in terms of their influence upon the 
structuration of people’s behaviour and upon the motivational backgrounds 
sustaining the construction of relational spaces. Given the emphasis Bourdieu 
and Boltanski place on the general function of social interests, it would be fair to 
suggest that the two thinkers share a functionalist conception of society. Despite 
this significant affinity, they offer radically different accounts of interest. 
First, they put forward different conceptions of the interests of social life. From 
a Bourdieusian point of view, the multiple interests at stake in social life are 
determined by power relations: the interests underpinning agents’ praxeological 
orientations and strategic behaviours are governed by the positions they occupy 
within social fields. From a Boltanskian point of view, the numerous interests 
at stake in social life are shaped by normative relations: the interests impacting 
upon actors’ pragmatic alignments and reflexive performances are affected 
by the negotiations they are obliged to undertake within different regimes of 
action, in order to establish and justify normative arrangements. 
Second, they subscribe to different conceptions of the interests of social 
groups. From a Bourdieusian perspective, not only individual interests but also 
  
 
collective interests are structured in a vertical manner: to the extent that all 
social fields are characterized by the structural gap between dominant groups 
and dominated groups, they are marked by an opposition between orthodox 
interests, mobilized in order to defend the legitimacy of the established order, 
and heterodox interests, hinting at the possibility of an alternative order. From 
a Boltanskian perspective, despite the undeniable existence of various group- 
based divisions in society, all human actors share a series of interests in a 
horizontal manner: even if all cités constitute regimes of action whose normative 
grammar is potentially contentious, and thus unavoidably malleable, social 
groups engaging in disputes about the coordination of their practices are 
united by a common interest – that is, not only by the pragmatic interest in 
securing their participation within a cité, but also by the ontological interest in 
expressing their belonging to humanity. 
Third, they maintain different conceptions of people’s interests. Bourdieu 
stresses the preponderant role of strategic action within structuration processes 
of social fields, in such a way that people are portrayed as agents motivated – 
primarily – by egoistic interests. Ultimately, what counts is power: our position 
in society depends on our capacity to affirm and, if necessary, impose our 
legitimacy. Insofar as we are structurally separated agents, our personal interest 
resides in the maximization of our chances of occupying dominant positions 
within social fields, in the preservation of legitimate dispositions of our 
habitus, and in the accumulation of different forms of capital. To the extent 
that Boltanski places the emphasis on the decisive role of discursive practices 
within structuration processes of cités, people are conceived of as actors who 
are motivated not only by egoistic interests but also by altruistic ones. At the end 
of the day, what matters is responsibility: our position within the cité depends 
on our capacity to prove and, if necessary, justify our legitimacy. As morally 
motivated entities, we have an interest in participating in the construction of 
regimes of action whose praxeological grammars are sustained by quotidian 
practices of justification. 
Fourth, they support different conceptions of the interests of social spaces. 
Following Bourdieu, a social field is a ‘space of possibles’, a ‘space of divisions’, and 
a ‘space of struggles’: 
 
(a) As a ‘space of possibles’, the social field designates a structuring horizon, 
which sets the limits for what agents can and cannot do. 
(b) As a ‘space of divisions’, the social field represents a stratifying horizon, 
which divides agents between those who are dominant and those who are 
dominated. 
(c) As a ‘space of struggles’, the social field constitutes a tension-laden horizon, 
in which agents compete for access to dominant positions and resources. 
  
 
Following Boltanski, a cité is a ‘space of engagement’, a ‘space of worth’, and a ‘space 
of disputes’: 
 
(a) As a ‘space of engagement’, the cité designates an interactional horizon, 
which forms the background against which actors are invested in the world. 
(b) As a ‘space of worth’, the cité represents the interpretive horizon, through 
which actors attribute meaning to their practices in accordance with 
specific principles. 
(c) As a ‘space of disputes’, the cité constitutes the normative horizon, which 
obliges actors to participate in processes of discussion oriented towards the 
justification of different modes of performance. 
 
Fifth, they make a case for different conceptions of the ‘raison d’être’ of social 
interests. What is the raison d’être of social interests? To the extent that Bourdieu 
and Boltanski are concerned with exploring the general function of social 
interests, their respective sociological approaches can be characterized as 
functionalist frameworks. From a Bourdieusian point of view, the raison d’être of 
social interests is the reproduction of interests by interested agents: an interested 
agent has an interest in pursuing his or her interests, in order to better their 
position in the social space. From a Boltanskian point of view, the raison d’être 
of social interests is the justification of interests by interested actors: an interested 
actor has an interest in justifying his or her interests, in order to prove the validity 
of the principles by which he or she is guided, thereby illustrating their context- 
specific generalizability. Following Bourdieu, social interests remain largely hidden 
when pursued by agents, who are not necessarily conscious of their motivations. 
Following Boltanski, social interests are often problematized when justified by 
actors, whose normative orientations are made explicit every time the legitimacy 
of their actions is called into question by discursive tests (épreuves) undertaken 
within regimes of justification. In short, according to Bourdieu, social interests 
are maintained by the reproduction of their legitimacy through the normalization 
of their validity; according to Boltanski, social interests are defended by the 
justification of their acceptability through the problematization of their validity. 
 
5. The Concept of ‘Aporia’ 
A fifth point of divergence arises from their interpretation of ‘aporia’ or ‘insoluble 
contradictions’ in rival intellectual frameworks. To be sure, the two sociological 
approaches in question can be regarded as reflexive endeavours to the extent that 
they aim to overcome the trap of reductionism in the social sciences. Despite 
this affinity, they differ in terms of their idiosyncratic criticisms of simplistic 
modes of social analysis.  A central objective of the Bourdieusian project 
  
 
consists in transcending the paradigmatic antinomy between ‘objectivist’ and 
‘subjectivist’ approaches in the social sciences. A key ambition of Boltanskian 
thought consists in challenging the fatalistic implications of ‘determinist’ theories, 
as well as the positivist pitfalls of ‘scientistic’ presuppositions, in contemporary 
sociology. Bourdieu seeks to overcome all forms of sociological reductionism 
that fail to account for the homological dialectic between positionally 
structured objectivities and dispositionally constituted subjectivities. Boltanski 
rejects all forms of sociological reductionism that fail to recognize that the 
normative grounds of critical sociology emanate from actors’ reflexive 
capacities. For Bourdieu, sociological reductionism results – above all – from 
‘the most fundamental, and the most ruinous’33 opposition in the social 
sciences – namely from ‘the one that is set up between subjectivism and 
objectivism’.34 For Boltanski, sociological reductionism results – primarily – 
from the ‘positivist’35 idealization of the critical competences of social- 
scientific researchers, as well as from the ‘fatalistic’36 suspicion vis-à-vis the 
critical competences of ordinary people. 
 
6. The Concept of ‘Background’ 
A sixth point of divergence has to do with the sociological function of ‘structural 
backgrounds’ or, put differently, ‘social grammars’. It is possible to characterize the 
two programmes as contextualist approaches, in the sense that – following the 
later Wittgenstein – they attribute fundamental importance to the role of ‘life 
forms’ in which human beings find themselves situated. Our view of the world 
and our behaviour in the world always depend on our ability to develop a sense 
of belonging to society and occupy a particular position within reality. We 
cannot engage with, be invested in, and develop an appreciation of the world 
unless we are situated in it and able to relate to it. The social universe within 
which we find ourselves situated constitutes the ‘coexistential grammar’ – 
that is, the ‘relational background’ – of all our experiential practices. What is 
striking in this respect is the fact that, despite their concordant recognition of 
the socio-ontological significance of ‘coexistential grammars’, Bourdieu and 
Boltanski put forward divergent conceptions of ‘social backgrounds’, which 
can be regarded as a precondition for the possibility of human coexistence. 
First, they endorse different conceptions of the space of social grammar. 
According to Bourdieu, the foundational space of human life is the field: all 
human interactions are situated in social fields, whose constitution and evolution 
determine the ways in which agents inhabit the world. From this perspective, 
people cannot be immersed in reality unless they participate in the construction 
of social fields. In fact, our ‘life-world’ (monde vécu) is an ensemble of ‘life-fields’ 
(champs vécus): our experience of the world depends  on  our  access to social fields. 
  
 
For, as interdependent beings, we establish a relationship with the world by 
forming a relationship with different interactional realms of our environment. 
The social field is the cradle of human action: we are situated in, and act upon, 
the world to the extent that we shape our existence within social fields. In brief, 
our world is the field. According to Boltanski, the foundational space of human 
life is the cité: all human interactions take place in cités, whose defining principles 
constitute the normative background against  which  ordinary  people  engage 
in processes of justification, in order to legitimize their place and role within 
different regimes of action. On this account, there is no normalization of the 
world without processes of justification within regimes of action. Indeed, our 
‘life-world’ (monde vécu) is an ensemble of ‘life-cities’ (cités vécus): our experience 
of society is inconceivable without our participation in different cités. For, as 
interdependent beings, we are invested in the world insofar as we contribute to 
the normative structuration of our environment. The cité is the foundational 
regime of human action: we are immersed in, and attribute meaning to, the 
world to the extent that we construct our existence by negotiating principles of 
justice in accordance with orders of worth established in our cités. In short, our 
world is the cité. 
Second, they advocate different conceptions of the nature of  social 
grammar. Bourdieu conceives of social backgrounds as horizons of cognitive 
presuppositions and normative codes, the existence of which is largely implicit 
and escapes the consciousness of habitualized agents. People’s unconscious is 
the coexistential force that lies at the heart of all forms of social cohesion. The 
underlying omnipresence of the unconscious precedes all reflexive movement 
towards consciousness. The doxa of every life form is largely unconscious, 
because every established mode of normativity depends on the blind 
reproduction of naturalized codes guaranteeing its legitimacy. Boltanski, on the 
other hand, interprets social backgrounds as horizons of orders of worth and 
normative codes, whose existence can be problematized by virtue of the critical 
consciousness of engaged actors. Critical consciousness is a coexistential force 
able to call everything that is normally taken for granted into question. The 
transformative force of critical consciousness is capable of undermining the 
reproductive power of the unconscious. Since reflexivity is inherent in every life 
form, the most established mode of normativity needs to justify its legitimacy 
through discursive tests (épreuves), which are necessary for the meaning-laden 
construction of cités. 
Third, they embrace different conceptions of the crisis of social grammar. 
According to Bourdieu, social backgrounds enter into crisis every time agents 
are confronted with a rupture of the homology established between field and habitus. The 
contradiction between a given field and a misadjusted habitus is the principal 
source of a transformative crisis.  To be exact, following the Bourdieusian 
  
 
approach, there are three types of crisis affecting the internal functioning of 
a field: 
 
(a) structural crisis, which occurs when the positional power and the material 
domination of dominant groups lack, or begin to lack, stability; 
(b) representational crisis, which is caused by a lack of legitimacy of both the 
symbolic orthodoxy and the ideological hegemony of dominant groups; 
and 
(c) circumstantial crisis, which is due to the fact that an agent, or a group of 
agents, is confronted with a situation in which their habitus no longer 
corresponds to the habitus required within a positionally structured context. 
 
According to Boltanski, by contrast, social backgrounds enter into crisis when 
actors succeed in undermining the legitimacy of an established mode of normativity, 
on the basis of tests (épreuves) enabling them to distance themselves from 
particular forms of immersion and to question specific modes of practical 
engagement. Consequently, an order of worth becomes fragile the moment 
the presence of its reality begins to lack legitimacy. The worth of a cité needs 
to be justified, or at least be justifiable, in order to assert the legitimacy       
of its reality, or at least of its realizability. The contradiction between a 
consolidated regime of action and a non-legitimized order of worth is the 
source of the sort of crisis that arises when the underlying grammar of a cité 
is called into question. To be precise, following the Boltanskian approach, 
we can distinguish three types of crisis concerning the internal functioning  
of a cité: 
 
(a) confirmative crisis, which is caused by ‘truth tests’ (épreuves de vérité) and which 
manifests itself in the conformist assertion of a given mode of action; 
(b) alterative crisis, which is provoked by ‘reality tests’ (épreuves de réalité) and which 
leads to the reformist modification of a particular mode of action; and 
(c) transformative crisis, which is triggered by ‘existential tests’ (épreuves existentielles) 
and which leads to the radical transformation of an existing mode of 
action.37 
 
In short, Bourdieu’s and Boltanski’s respective interpretations of social 
background crises diverge in the following sense: for the former, crisis is – 
above all – produced by conflicts over  the  structuration,  representation, 
and delimitation of social space; for the latter, crisis results – first and 
foremost – from alternating processes of confirmation, modification, and 
transformation, whose dynamic force shapes the development of every 
regime of action. 
  
 
7. The Concept of ‘Power’ 
A seventh point of divergence stems from dissimilar understandings of the 
concept of ‘social power’ in general and the concept of ‘social domination’ in 
particular. To be sure, Bourdieusian and Boltanskian research programmes 
are united by the conviction that a comprehensive sociology needs to take  
on the challenge of exploring the constitution of social power by shedding 
light on its origins, functioning, and consequences. Yet, despite this common 
mission, they offer fundamentally different conceptions of power. This can be 
illustrated on various levels. 
First, they put forward different conceptions of what may be described as 
the space of power. What is the foundational space in which power exercises its 
social function? Put differently, how does power succeed in structuring social 
action and, in some cases, even in determining it? According to Bourdieu, the 
foundational space of power is the field: agents’ access to specific types of power 
depends on their positioning within their environment. The most differentiated 
habitus and the richest form capital have no value if they are not incorporated 
by an agent invested in a field. Social power without a field is tantamount to 
a human agent without an environment. Power games are intertwined with 
the stakes of the field in which they are embedded. According to Boltanski, 
by contrast, the foundational space of social power is the cité: actors’ access to 
specific types of power depends on their capacity to participate in pluralized 
modes of action. The most powerful human competences have no value 
unless they are mobilized by actors prepared to take part in the negotiation  
of principles and establish different normativities with particular cités. Social 
power without a cité is equivalent to a human actor without a regime of 
action. The power games within every society need to be justified through 
tests (épreuves) undertaken within particular cités. In short, for Bourdieu, power 
relations are established by social struggles within and between different fields, 
and they are reproduced by agents capable of competition, contestation, and 
confrontation; for Boltanski, power relations are negotiated and problematized 
by controversies within and between cités, and they are called into question by 
actors capable of reflection, discussion, and justification. 
Second, they subscribe to different conceptions of the polycentric constitution 
of power. Following Bourdieu, the polycentric constitution of power derives 
from the plurality of fields, which is reflected in a multiplicity of forms of habitus 
and types of capital. Regardless of what the predominant social field – which 
serves as the interactional background for the unfolding of a given practice – 
may be, social relations between agents are determined by power relations 
consolidated within and between fields. Different forms of field produce 
different kinds of habitus with different types of capital. Notwithstanding the 
  
 
particular realm in question – that is, irrespective of whether it is cultural, 
linguistic, political, economic, scientific, religious, intellectual, or artistic38 –, 
the differentiation of social relations manifests itself in a complexification of 
power relations. Every field distinguishes itself by a particular definition of 
stakes, implying that power games can challenge the imperatives ensuring its 
reproduction. Following Boltanski, by contrast, the polycentric constitution of 
power emanates from the plurality of ‘cités’, which is illustrated in the existence of 
a multiplicity of regimes of action, regulated and contested by numerous forms 
of worth (grandeur). Regardless of what the predominant cité – which plays the 
role of an interactional grammar for the unfolding of a given practice – may 
be,  normative relations between actors can always be called into question  
by inhabitants of the cité. Different forms of cité produce different regimes 
of action with different types of grandeur. Notwithstanding the particular 
realm in question – that is, irrespective of whether it is inspired, domestic, 
opinion-related, civic, market-based, or industrial39 –, the differentiation of 
social worlds leads to a pluralization of disputes that challenge the legitimacy 
of different established orders. Every cité distinguishes itself by generating 
controversies oriented towards the justification of principles that either 
maintain or transform its regime of action. 
Third, they defend different conceptions of the realization of power. The 
Bourdieusian approach is marked by ‘anthropological pessimism’, in the sense 
that it places the emphasis on the reproduction of power, which is founded on 
the socio-ontological preponderance of teleological action. From this perspective, 
social actions are not only permeated and influenced by power, but often they 
are also motivated and determined by it. Thus, agents are regarded not only as 
unconscious accomplices of an underlying structure, but also as producers  
of power-laden practices. The Boltanskian approach, by contrast, is marked 
by ‘anthropological optimism’, in the sense that it stresses the transformation 
of power, which is brought about by the socio-ontological preponderance of 
discursive action. On this view, social actions are not only embedded in the 
dialectical game between domination and emancipation, but, in addition, they 
depend on normative processes of reflection and justification. Hence, actors are 
considered to be critical negotiators of social arrangements, rather than blind 
reproducers of omnipotent power mechanisms. 
Fourth, they support different conceptions of the critique of power. Within 
Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, the critique of power is a particular privilege of 
experts: to the degree that the social mechanisms sustaining power relations operate 
as underlying structural processes, ordinary people are incapable of uncovering, 
let alone understanding, the multiple determinants of their environment.  On 
this account, immediate immersion within social life is an obstacle to, rather 
than a facilitator of, reflexive comprehension.  Within Boltanski’s theoretical 
  
 
framework, on the other hand, the critique of power is a universal resource of human 
beings: to the degree that the normative relations regulating power relations 
function as coordinating discursive processes, ordinary people are capable of 
justifying, and also of criticizing, the principles and conventions they have to 
take into account within the regimes of action established in their cités. On this 
view, immediate immersion within social life is a facilitator of, rather than an 
obstacle to, reflexive comprehension. 
Fifth, they create different conceptions of the power of power. What is the 
power inherent in power? The Bourdieusian perspective is marked by ‘socio- 
ontological fatalism’, according to which power possesses the power to impose an 
unconscious complicity, which appears as the implicit condition necessary for 
the functioning of an environment structured by the relational spaces of fields. 
Put differently, the power of power results not only from its omnipresence 
but also from its omnipotence – that is, from its capacity to penetrate and 
determine all actions of a given society. The Boltanskian view,  by  contrast, 
is characterized by ‘socio-ontological normativism’, according to which power 
possesses the power to trigger the formation of critical reflexivity, understood 
as a practical resource capable of calling the legitimacy of material and 
symbolic arrangements into question. In other words, the power of power 
derives from its capacity to be justified and legitimized, thereby contributing 
to the stability of cités, which represent the referential framework of its own 
reality. In short, in Bourdieu, the power of power is rooted in its unconscious 
and ubiquitous constitution, contributing to its constant reproduction; in 
Boltanski, the power of power depends on its capacity to be accepted on the 
basis of its confrontation with tests (épreuves) undertaken by members of a cité, 
whose discursive processes can cause its transformation. 
 
8. The Concept of ‘Emancipation’ 
An eighth point of divergence concerns the concept of ‘emancipation’. Both 
Bourdieu and Boltanski regard sociology as a committed endeavour, in the sense 
that both thinkers aim to examine and denounce the negative consequences 
of systems of domination. Whilst Bourdieu and Boltanski agree on the 
importance of criticizing both the existence and the effects of domination, 
insisting on the possibility of a society capable of realizing its normative  
and creative potential, their conceptions of emancipation differ in various 
respects. 
First, they endorse different conceptions of emancipatory competence – that 
is, of people’s capacity to understand the contingent conditions of their 
existence and of their ability to transform social arrangements in accordance 
with their needs.  According  to  Bourdieu, emancipatory competence can be 
  
conceived of as a privilege of experts: the capacity to contribute to processes 
of emancipation is, above all, a scientific competence, developed on the basis 
of  theoretical  reflection  and  oriented  towards  practical  transformation.  
If ordinary agents remain confined by the limitations of predetermined 
schemes of action and comprehension, then common-sense knowledge is little 
more than a form of misrecognition based on doxa. Doxa cannot transcend 
the status of an erroneous representation, founded on a limited perception 
and a simplified understanding of reality.  Scientific reflexivity allows for  
the development of a critical perspective, derived from a methodical and 
analytical grasp of reality. According to Boltanski, by contrast, emancipatory 
competence can be regarded as a privilege of ordinary people: the capacity to 
participate in processes of emancipation is an ordinary competence, to which, in 
principle, all human beings have access and which they need in order to assert 
themselves as creators of their own destiny. If ordinary actors are equipped 
with emancipatory capacities, notably with reflexive competences, then the 
knowledge they produce and the discussions in which they engage are a sign of 
their capacity to comprehend their own reality and to coordinate their actions 
in accordance with moral considerations, in order to legitimize particular 
regimes of action in their society.  The capacity for reflection and the force  
of justification are crucial to processes of socialization, without which actors 
would not be able to construct regimes of action. 
Second, they advocate different conceptions of emancipatory resources – 
that is, of  liberating the human potential that can be mobilized in order       
to undermine mechanisms of domination. The Bourdieusian account of 
emancipatory resources is embedded in a rationalist and scientistic understanding 
of  emancipation.40  On  this  view,  the  main  instrument  that  permits  us   
to transform social reality in a positive way is critical rationality: scientific 
distance-taking is inconceivable without the use of critical rationality, which 
is fundamental to sociological reflexivity. Bourdieusian sociology seeks to 
promote critical rationality,  in order to replace immersive and doxic forms  
of misrecognition with reflexive and scientific modes of investigation. The 
Boltanskian conception of emancipatory resources, by contrast, rests on a 
normativist and contextualist interpretation of emancipation. From this point 
of view, the principal resource for structuring the material and symbolic 
dimensions of reality in accordance with the needs of a common humanity  
is our discursive and moral capacity, which enables us to construct and, if 
necessary, reconcile different dimensions of practical normativity: the everyday 
questioning of social arrangements is unthinkable without the human capacity 
to create and justify different modes of normativity. Boltanskian sociology 
reminds us that our participation in discursive processes of coordination and 
justification is vital to all collective projects oriented towards the possibility 
  
 
of emancipation. In short, for Bourdieu, there is no human emancipation 
without critical sociology; for Boltanski, there is no human emancipation without 
a critical society. 
Third, they embrace different conceptions of emancipatory projects. 
Undoubtedly, the two sociological programmes share a radical scepticism 
towards political projects that are motivated by ideological dogmatism. At the 
same time, these two intellectual frameworks endorse not only a theoretical 
questioning of socio-historical realities, but also a genuine engagement with 
their practical transformation. Paradoxically, this point of convergence is, at 
the same time, a point of divergence. Highlighting the explanatory capacity 
of science and its ability to intervene in public debates, Bourdieusian thought 
portrays social emancipation as an inexorable process, which is contingent upon 
modern societies’ capacity to draw upon the unmasking power of scientific 
reasoning. In this sense, scientific knowledge is the source of relative ontological 
certainty. Insisting on the discursive and reflexive resources of ordinary social 
life, Boltanskian thought conceives of emancipation as a possibility, contingent 
upon the capacity of pluralized societies to cope with their own complexity, 
by recognizing the pivotal role played by regimes of action when generating 
regimes of justification. Put  differently,  the  unavoidable  is  conceived  of 
as something entirely avoidable, and the avoidable is treated as something 
utterly unavoidable. On this  account,  reflexive  knowledge  is  the  source 
of relative ontological uncertainty. In short, for Bourdieu, the pursuit of social 
emancipation results from the relative ontological certainty expressed by the 
critical rationality inherent in scientific knowledge; for Boltanski, the pursuit 
of social emancipation needs to face up to the radical ontological uncertainty 
problematized by critical reflexivity inherent in pragmatic knowledge. 
 
Conclusion 
To what extent can Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ and Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic 
sociology of critique’ be reconciled? And to what extent does such an 
undertaking permit us to develop a conceptual framework capable of 
contributing to a better understanding of the complexity of social life? In order 
to respond to these questions, the previous analysis has examined the principal 
points of convergence and divergence between Bourdieusian and Boltanskian 
thought. As illustrated above, despite the considerable theoretical differences 
that separate the two intellectual currents from one another, they are far  
from incommensurable. In fact, a systematic comparison of their approaches 
demonstrates that Bourdieu and Boltanski share a series of theoretical 
concerns and that, more importantly, they concur on various normative issues, 
particularly  with regard to their critique of relations of domination  and their 
  
 
insistence on the possibility of emancipation. Instead of recapitulating the key 
points of the preceding study, this chapter shall conclude by formulating eight 
hypotheses on the basis of which it may be possible to cross-fertilize Bourdieu’s 
‘critical sociology’ and Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’: 
 
(1) There is no scientific knowledge without everyday knowledge, for the 
reflexive positions of experts are rooted in the critical capacities of ordinary 
people. 
(2) Founded on the structural determination of social life, homological 
realities cannot do away with the unforced force of critique, which permits 
to convert every regime of action into a space of justification. 
(3) Just as every social field forms a space of action that requires processes of 
justification, every cité constitutes a relational regime marked by structural 
divisions. 
(4) To the extent that people are agents who are embedded in social relations 
governed by systemic mechanisms of competition and confrontation, they 
are actors capable of generating links founded on normative processes of 
justification and cooperation. Strategic action is inconceivable without 
reflexive action. 
(5) Critical competence, which enables us to convert reality into an object   
of reflection, is always situated in a doxic horizon, composed of 
preconceptions. 
(6) The normativity of every cité, sustained by principles of context-dependent 
generalizability, is determined by the legitimacy of fields, defined by the 
symbolic power of social positioning. 
(7) To the degree that normative configurations created within cités are 
impregnated with power relations generated within fields, the division 
between dominant groups and dominated groups within the social space 
can be called into question on the basis of debates focused on the distinction 
between justifiable and unjustifiable tests. 
(8) Critical sociology needs the sociology of  critique, because the critique   
of society derives its normative resources from the society of critique. At 
the same time, the sociology of critique needs critical sociology, because 
the society of critique squanders its emancipatory resources without the 
critique of society. 
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